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FOREWORD 
Contribution tothe MetropoZitan Study: 20 
The p r o j e c t  "Nested Dynamics o f  M e t r o p o l i t a n  Processes and P o l i c i e s "  
i s  a  c o l l a b o r a t i v e  s tudy  w i t h i n  t h e  p r o j e c t  area Regional Issues a t  IIASA. 
The s e r i e s  o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i s  a.means o f  conveying i n f o r m a t i o n  between 
t h e  c o l l a b o r a t o r s  i n  t h e  network o f  t he  p r o j e c t .  
This  paper r e p o r t s  on a  pene t ra t i ng  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  t he  housing 
market i n  t h e  Stockholm reg ion .  It i s  based on a  sequence o f  i n t e r v i e w s  
and d iscuss ions  w i t h  va r i ous  d e c i s i o n  makers and managers whose ac t i ons  
form an impor tan t  market system. The paper examines t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  
system s t r u c t u r e  w i t h  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  f o rmu la t i ng  a  r e l i a b l e  model o f  
t ransac t ions ,  regu la t i ons ,  investments, e t c .  The work on t h e  model i t s e l f  
i s  c u r r e n t l y  underway and w i l l  a l s o  be presented i n  t h e  near f u t u r e .  
The approach undertaken by t h e  au thors  i s  o r i g i n a l  i n  i t s  c a r e f u l  
t reatment  o f  such system p r o p e r t i e s  which c o n s t i t u t e  dev ia t i ons  from a  f r e e  
market. Consequently, t h e  paper p rov ides  an a l ready  tes ted  g u i d e l i n e  f o r  
t he  work on t h e  housing sec to r  i n  o t h e r  m e t r o p o l i t a n  reg ions  i n  t h e  study. 
Recently, t h i s  type  o f  work has been i n i t i a t e d  i n  severa l  o f  those reg ions .  
It i s  be l i eved  t h a t  t h i s  work may b r i n g  about a new genera t ion  o f  housing 
sec to r  model ing and a  renewal o f  t h e  p e r t i n e n t  analyses. 
i k e  E. Andersson 
Professor  o f  Economics 
Leader, Regional Issues P r o j e c t  
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THE SWEDISH HOUSING MARKET: STRUCTURE, POLICY ISSLES AND 
ttmoamG 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper i s  an  examination of the Swedish housing sec to r  institutions with 
part icular emphasis on t h e  public control  measures on the  demand and supply 
sides. Our observations are re levant  t o  t h e  metropoli tan housing marke t s  of 
Grea te r  Stockholm, Grea te r  Gijteborg and G r e a t e r  Malmo, although main points 
also apply t o  the non-metropolitan p a r t  of Sweden. 
In the l i tera ture  on t h e  Swedish housing sector,  a single comprehensive state- 
ment  of how this  sec to r  is structured,  how i t  operates  and how i t  is controlled by 
various government policy instruments, does not  exist.' I t  i s  hoped t h a t  t h e  
current  paper provides the  f i rs t  comprehensive view t h a t  can be  a s tar t ing point 
for  future, more  detailed investigations. 
The Swedish housing sector  i s  based on social  values and a t t i tudes  qui te  d i f ferent  
f rom those prevailing in purely f ree-market  oriented societies such a s  the  United 
States. I t  i s  the re fore  useful t o  many socie t ies  t h a t  the Swedish si tuation b e  
evaluated f rom t h e  vantage point of f r e e  marke t  urban and housing economics. 
The f ree  marke t  perspective helps identify "distortions" which a r e  induced by 
various government controls. F r o m  t h e  Swedish perspective, these  a r e  no t  
distortions, bu t  policy interventions justified for the  sake o f  distr ibutive justice 
and enti t lement.  R e n t  controls and the  insti tution of rationing new dwellings a r e  
among such policy interventions. Nevertheless, the re  a r e  some important simi- 
lari t ies (and differences) between t h e  Swedish and American policies with regard 
t o  the  deductibility of home owners' in te res t  payments, t h e  taxation of capi ta l  
gains and t h e  levying of a "property tax" proportional t o  assessed value. 
We identify a number of policy issues which a r e  clf concern t o  Swedish 
economists and politicians. These are t h e  interactions between government 
subsidies, housing sec to r  performance and macro-economic policy, planning t h e  
expansion of the s tock by region and municipality, and the  rationing of new 
dwellings more  efficiently. 
Reforming t h e  Swedish housing marke t  is also discussed by considering how t h e  
marke t  and t h e  insti tutions can  be  reorganized in major ways. While such 
reorganization may appear very appropr ia te  f rom t h e  f ree  market  viewpoint, i t  
may be only part ly desirable f rom t h e  Swedish viewpoint. 
The paper also discusses the need for a mathematical, empirically workable and 
policy-oriented dynamic model o f  the Swedish housinq market. The policy 
perspectives developed in the paper are candidates for empirical testing w i th  
such a model. 2 
Intentionally, the paper is kept free o f  tables and figures even though much 
quantitative data has been examined in preparation. We wish the reader to  gain 
an accurate conceptual framework for thinking about the qualitative structure o f  
the Swedish housing market and do not  wish an extravaganza of numbers t o  cloud 
this objective. 3 
STRUCTURE ff lli€ SWEDISH HOUSING SECTOR 
Sweden is the fourth largest country in Europe i n  land area. Only 10 per cent of 
i t s  land is cult ivated and 50 per cent is forest. The population is 8.3 mil l ion and 
the density only 20 inhabitants per square kilometer. The populations o f  the 
three largest metropolitan areas are: Stockholm (1.39 million), Gijteborg (0.69 
mil l ion) and Malmo (0.45 million), amounting t o  16.7 per cent, 8.4 per cent and 
5.5 per cent o f  the national population, respectively (Sweden, 1983). 
The low population density and the abundance of t imber resources may suggest 
that large Swedish ci t ies would be sprawled and primari ly consist o f  spacious 
wooden single family homes. A number o f  factors have contributed to the 
opposite; thus, Swedish metropolitan areas have a large share of compactly bu i l t  
large mult i family buildings and complexes. The important factors in this regard 
are the need to  conserve energy in heating and transportation, strong 
government control  over building act iv i ty  since World War I1 and a national goal 
o f  making social services easily accessible t o  most inhabitants. 
1.1 The State, the Counties and the ~ u n i c i ~ a l i t i e a ~  
Sweden's national or central  government (hereafter, the State) consists of twelve 
ministries, one of which is the Ministry o f  Housing and Physical Planning, which 
is responsible for physical planning, housing provision and building. The country is  
divided into 24 counties which constitute a regional form of government. The 
County Administrative Boards coordinate State planning wi th in the county and 
ac t  in a supervisory capacity, hearing appeals and rat i fy ing plans adopted by the 
municipalities, County Housing Boards come under the Nat ional  Housing Board 
and administer State loans and grants for housing provision. 
The country is divided into about 200 municipalities, Since 1945, there has been a 
gradual reduction in the number o f  municipalities by consolidating them and thus 
improving eff iciency i n  public service provision. In the county of Stockholm, for 
example, the number of municipalities has been reduced f rom 109 in 1945 to 25 
in 1980, Greater Stockholm now consists of 22 o f  these, excluding three 
peripheral municipalities, The largest municipality in Greater Stockholm is 
Stockholm c i ty  which comprises the core o f  the region. For  a study of the 
interactions o f  State and municipal polit ics in the Stockholm region, see Anton 
(1975). 
There i s  a division o f  responsibility between the State and the municipal 
governments. The State sets out the financial extent of new housing construction 
and rehabilitation, provides aid in the form o f  housing allowances and loans, 
interest subsidies for new construction and rehabilitation, enacts legislation and 
formulates taxation policy i n  relation to  housing goals. The municipalities are 
responsible for physical planning and land policy, assessment o f  local housing 
needs, granting housing allowances wi th part ial  state funding, and receiving and 
forwarding to the centra l  government applications for  loans and grants. 
Key legislation which regulates the planning process and building act iv i ty 
consists o f  a number o f  acts. The Building A c t  contains regulations on the 
supervision o f  the planning process and of development procedures. The Building 
Ordinance regulates building permission and design standards, The Swedish 
Building Code regulates the detailed design and construction of buildings. The 
Pre-Errption A c t  enables the municipality t o  take over the buyer's place, 
acquiring real estate changing hands in an ongoing transaction by paying to  the 
seller the pr ice agreed upon between buyer and seller. The purpose o f  this law is 
to  enable land acquisition in advance of urban development. The Expropriation 
A c t  makes it possible for  the municipality to acquire land which is required for 
development. The Nature Conservanscy A c t  regulates adverse effects from 
water and air pollution and noise. 
Drawing i t s  powers f rom these legislative acts, Swedish municipal governments 
have strong control over land use and the housing stock. Municipalities own or 
can acquire substantial lands within their  domain. Thus they are the chief 
suppliers o f  land t o  developers and can designate the type and extent of 
development in binding master plans. Another means o f  control  is that munici- 
palities own the non-profit housinq companies which bui ld and manage a large 
part o f  a municipality's rental housinq stock. 
1.2 Land use and the ownerahip, a p p l y  end pricing o f  land 
The municipality's master plan is the ul t imate means which determines land use. 
A master plan normally specifies the type of land use and amount o f  f loor space 
t o  be bui l t  in each a r e a  Private landowners must request a plan for developing 
their land in a desired manner. I f  the municipality denies them such a plan the 
pr ivate landowners do not generally have the r ight  to go to  court. Municipalities 
can refuse development requests for  various reasons, including, for example, high 
costs o f  supplying the land w i th  public infrastructure, ut i l i t ies and public 
services. 
Swedish municipalities have been buying, selling and leasing land for many 
decades. As a result they now generally own most of the land to be used for  
urban development within their jurisdictions. They are i n  a strong monopoly 
situation w i th  respect t o  housinq developments since these are heavily subsidized 
by the State subject t o  a "land condition rule" which states that a builder cannot 
in general get a subsidized loan unless the land on which he builds is  acquired 
f rom the municipality. The most important exception f rom this rule concerns 
construction of detached single family houses. Commercial and industrial 
development in Sweden is not subsidized and builders must obtain a loan a t  the 
market interest rate. Builders o f  such developments are free to  build on non- 
municipal land but must, of course, abide by municipal approval based on the 
master plan. 
When selling land to  developers, municipalities charge the cost o f  acquiring 
comparable land a t  the current t ime plus the costs o f  any land improvements and 
administration. In the case of housing developers, the principle that the 
municipality should make no p ro f i t  guides the transaction. I n  the case o f  non- 
residential developers, the re  is no law against  a t t empt ing  t o  e x t r a c t  the  highest 
price t h e  buyer is willing t o  pay. If t h e  municipalities do not  sell the  land a t  very 
low prices, i.e. t o  increase the  employment possibilities for municipal residents, 
they t ry  no t  t o  exceed a conservatively es t imated  price. One reason for this is, 
of course, t h a t  any sa le  price paid t o  the  municipality can  be used by pr ivate  
landowners selling t o  t h e  municipality in t h e  future,  or  by others  whose land i s  
being expropriated by t h e  municipality, t o  argue t h a t  they are enti t led t o  t h e  
same pr ice  o r  compensation. 
Expropriation with adequate  compensation is a power of t h e  municipalities, bu t  
they choose t o  exercise i t  with caution since i t  can  be  challenged in cour t  with 
the  municipality being liable f o r  t h e  legal costs  of t h e  property owner at t h e  pre- 
appellate level. 
Often,  municipalities choose t o  maintain land ownership by leasing land t o  be 
developed according t o  plan. This ar rangement  is known a s  a lease-hold system. 
The Stockholm municipality, f o r  example, operates  a large  lease-hold system. 
Lease  values can  be  changed a t  fixed t ime  intervals which over the  years have 
been gradually reduced from sixty t o  ten  years. This enables the  municipality t o  
e x t r a c t  f rom t h e  lessee t h e  current  value of t h e  land, although lease  holders c a n  
have legal  recourse. 
The primary e f f e c t  of these  Swedish land ownership institutions is tha t  land 
speculation is  severely discouraged and successfully curtailed. Developers c a n  
obtain land a t  low prices when buying f rom the  municipality fo r  purposes of 
subsidized developments such as housing. A segmented land market  exists  s ince  
commercial-industrial developments a r e  free t o  occur on private land and at  
unrestricted prices a s  long as they a r e  consistent  with t h e  municipal land use 
plan. Municipalities rarely change their  land use plans. This is in sharp contras t  
with American zoning specifications which are frequently changed in t imes  of 
development pressures. Since Swedish land use plans a r e  so  stable, i t  is rarely 
possible for  pr ivate  landowners t o  profi t  f rom anticipating changes in these  
plans; and, conversely, i t  is equally rare  t h a t  municipalities have t o  compensate  
landowners who s tand t o  lose f rom changes in t h e  land use plan. 
Since landownership is so  highly centralized,  t h e  land "market" is not a 
compet i t ive  one. Municipalities can fo rce  housing developments t o  occur in 
places where competitive market land prices would be too low to allow 
development. This type o f  pattern has appeared in some suburbs o f  Stockholm. A 
consequence of this is that  turnover and vacancy rates in such places are 
observed t o  be unusually high. 
1.3 The Type, Quality and Ownership of the Housing Stock 
F i rs t  o f  a l l  it must be emphazised that  houses in Sweden are bu i l t  by pr ivate 
firms. The main exception is BPA, a construction f i r m  owned by the trade 
unions. However, the orderers of new construction as regards mult i family 
housing are, in most cases, non-profit companies owned by the municipalities or 
cooperatives. 
The housing stock in Sweden can be grouped into three categories. These are as 
follows: 
(a) Single family housing: These dwellings are generally owner-occupied by 
famil ies and they are mostly constructed by private builders, t o  be bought and 
occupied by families. A striking aspect of these dwellings is that  a large part of 
them is of ten planned into subdivisions in which they are spaced closely. There 
are precise building standards which apply t o  design and construction and careful 
attention is paid to  their proximity and relation to public facilities, shopping, 
open space and public utilities. 
A substantial par t  o f  the single family stock is of older vintage and does not 
necessarily conform to  current building standards. 
(b) Coopetative Multifamily Buildings: These dwellings are individual f lats in 
mult i family buildings and they are tenant owned. Owners have the same rights as 
single family dwelling owners in purchasing and selling these units, except that 
they are subject t o  some control  by the cooperative association in the areas o f  
repair and renovation. Also, the maintenance o f  common facil i t ies i n  these 
buildings is financed by means o f  an assessment levied on the tenants by the 
association. The Swedish cooperative market is to some extent dominated by 
large cooperative associations. The largest are HSB and Svenska Riksbyggen 
which are nationwide associations w i th  branch associations i n  counties, munici- 
palit ies and individual buildings. 
(c) Rental Multifamily B u i l d i m  A large par t  of the stock in Sweden consists 
of rental  f la ts  in multifamily buildings. Approximately half of these buildings a r e  
owned and managed by private landlords. However, since World War 11, the bulk 
of multifamily buildings have been ordered by non-profit housing companies. 
These companies generally retain ownership and management of the buildings. 
Each municipality owns a t  least  one non-profit company. The Stockholm muni- 
cipality owns a number of such companies, the  largest being AB Svenska 
Bostiider which has a holding of over 50,000 flats. 
Tenants who obtain a f l a t  hold an irrevocable lease and have the  right t o  remain 
in the f la t  indefinitely a s  long as they conform to  the  conditions of their lease 
and continue t o  make rental  payments. 
I t  is sometimes the case, and increasingly so in recent  years, t ha t  some privately 
owned rental  buildings a r e  converted to  the cooperative mode and turned over t o  
a cooperative association for  management. This is usually possible if the owner 
wish t o  sell and a majority of the  tenants in a rental  building vote in favor of  
conversion. 
Swedish multifamily buildings a r e  generally compactly built and contain small 
flats. There is visible differentiation in architectural features  and in the number 
of stories by vintage. A great  deal of this differentiation can be explained by 
changes in the building code and changes in construction costs  over time. 
Building complexes constructed since World War I1 are  generally carefully 
situated near transit stations and contain within them shopping facilities, 
recreational grounds and schools. 
A t  this point, i t  is useful t o  c i t e  some aggregate statistics. In the year 1980, 
44 per cen t  of Sweden's dwellings were single family and 56 per cen t  were 
multifamily. For  Greater Stockholm, the corresponding percentages were 
24 per cen t  and 76 per cent, for  Grea te r  Goteborg, 32 per cen t  and 68 per cent,  
and for Greater  MalmB, 31 per cen t  and 69 per cent. While a nearly uniform 
93 per cen t  of all single family dwellings around the nation was owned by private 
persons, the ownership of the multifamily stock exhibits more diversity among 
the three metropolitan areas. Non-profit companies (controlled by the munici- 
palities) owned 35 per cent, 42 per cen t  and 18 per cent  of the multifamily stock 
in' Greater  Stockholm, Gijteborg and Malmo respectively with cooperative 
I 
associations owning 25 per cent, 23 per cent and 40 per cent of the mul t i fami ly  
stock in the respective metropolitan areas, and private persons and companies 
owning 39 per cent, 32 per cent and 39 per cent respectively (Statistics Sweden, 
1983). These figures show that  despite the great growth o f  cooperatives and non- 
pro f i t  rental  dwellings af ter  World War 11, large parts of the to ta l  mult i family 
rental stock and predominant portions of the older stock continue to  be owned by 
private landlords. f he figures also show that  there are significant differences 
among the metropolitan areas which are not entirely explained by the size of 
these areas. The large proportion of cooperatives i n  Malmo is one such 
difference. 
L4 Finance o f  New C m s t r u c t i m  and ~ o d e r n i t a t i o n ~  
As a rule, the Swedish State subsidizes nearly a l l  new construction i n  the housing 
sector. In contrast, other construction such as commercial and industrial is not  
subsidized. The subsidies take the form o f  State mortgage loans and guaranteed 
interest rates on f i rst  mortgage loans. The interest rates for both kind of loans 
are much below the market rate. 
Developers are free to  build w i th  market loans but the State subsidy is so large 
that any such construction is unprofitable. To qualify for a State subsidy a 
private builder or non-profit company must fu l f i l l  the following requirements: 
(a) it must build on municipally owned land and according to  the master plan, 
(b) it must conform to  the building code and (c) i t must apply for approval by the 
municipality demonstrating that  i t s  estimated construction cost w i l l  not be much 
i n  excess of the "approved construction cost" for that  locality. 
To f u l f i l l  the last requirement the builder files an application which shows the 
calculation o f  the "approved construction cost" for the proposed building by using 
unit prices published frequently by the government. I n  addition to this, the 
builder also estimates the actual construction expense that  w i l l  be incurred, this 
number being generally higher than the approved cost. If the difference i s  
deemed too high, a State loan cannot be obtained. 
The subsidized loan structure is as follows: Fo r  rental  dwellings bui l t  by non- 
prof i t  companies: 100 per cent of the "approved construction cost" receives a 
subsidized loan, Fo r  cooperatives and single family dwellings and privately owned 
rental  houses the cormsponding percentages are 9 9  per cent, 95  per cent and 
92 per cent respectively. The unsubsidized port ion and any excess over the 
approved construction cost must be covered by a market loan, 
A mortgage loan equal to  70 per cent o f  the approved construction cost is 
obtained f rom a bank, the State subsidizing this bank for  the difference between 
market and loan interest rates, Recently, the market ra te  on these bank loans 
has been 1 2  per cent and it is  adjusted a t  five-year intervals. The subsidized loan 
interest ra te  for mult i family construction is 3 per cent in the f i rs t  year and rises 
indefinitely by an increment of 0.25 per cent a year. Fo r  single family homes the 
loan interest ra te  is  5.5 per cent in the f i rst  year and rises a t  0.5 per cent yearly 
un t i l  it catches the market interest rate. 
The remaining 30 per cent, 29 per cent, 25 per cent or 22 per cent o f  the 
approved construction cost (for non-profit rental, cooperative, single family 
dwellings and privately owned rental, respectively), comes direct ly f rom the 
State. The subsidized interest rates and annual increments for this port ion o f  the 
loans are the same as for the bank loans. A peculiar aspect of this subsidization 
scheme is the method o f  amortization for these loans. The government has 
stated the goal (or expectation) that  the State port ion o f  the loan be paid o f f  in 
30 years. However, for mul t i fami ly  houses this may or may not come about. The 
reason is that the payments on the State loan which gradually increase are not 
applied toward capital  amortization unt i l  the interest rate catches the annually 
adjusted normal rate. Thereafter, any difference between the interest rate on 
the loan and the normal ra te  is  applied toward amortization. I f  the normal rate 
goes over the subsidized rate, then amortization ceases. The peculiarity is that, 
conceivably, the subsidized rate may never exceed the normal rate and thus 
amortization may never begin. For  single family houses the amortization o f  the 
State loan starts immediately a f te r  the house is constructed and goes on for 30 
years. 
The bank port ion o f  the loan fo r  mult i family houses is subject to more r ig id rules 
of  amortization. It is guaranteed to be amortized in 50 years w i th  principal 
payments graduated in ten-year intervals. The equivalent t ime for single family 
houses is 40 years. 
The State and d s i d i z e d  bank loans are in principle assumable by a l l  future 
ownera However, the f i rs t  buyer of a single family home normally relieves the 
builder f rom the market loan and pays the difference between the pr ice and f i rs t  
mortgage plus state loan as a down payment. The same procedure applies to  
cooperative associations. In a next step the down payment is  distributed among 
the members, i.e. the households l iv ing in the building. 
In recent years, new construction act iv i ty  in Sweden has diminished substan- 
tially, becoming replaced, in large measure, by reconstruction and modernization 
activity. Modernization refers t o  major upgrading of a building, addition o f  
faci l i t ies and repairs and, frequently merging flats within the building t o  create 
a smaller number of larger flats. The State subsidizes modernization by loans to  
be repaid within a maximum o f  30 years. These are also subject to approval by 
the municipalities and excesses over approved costs must be covered by market 
loans. 
Starting in 1984 the State also subsidizes loans fur repairs and maintenance in 
mult i family houses. The loans are given by certain banks and the subsidy has the 
form o f  an interest guarantee. The subsidy is available for non-profit companies, 
cooperatives and private owners o f  mult i family rentals. The subsidy system is 
quite different from the general interest subsidy system and it is ef fect ive for 10 
or 20 years due to the di f ferent measures for  improvement in  the building. 
1.5 Pricing, Rent Control, Rent  Pooling and Rent Negotiations 6 
In Sweden, the pricing o f  the housing stock follows the principle that  munici- 
pal i ty owned companies should not make a pro f i t  or, in the case o f  pr ivate 
landlords, not more than a small margin of profit. 
Fo r  single family (owner-occupied) dwellings, this principle is enforced by 
regulated pricing. A builder sells these dwellings a t  the approved pr ice which is 
set a t  the t ime of the subsidized loan application. These prices are set t o  cover 
precisely the builder's estimated construction cost, assuming these estimates are 
not  high enough to  result in rejection o f  the application. When a builder sells a t  
this price, the buyer, usually a household, makes a down payment equal to the 
unsubsidized portion o f  the builder's loan and assumes the subsidized State and 
bank loans. If such a buyer (the first-owner) wishes t o  resell the dwelling within 
three years, he cannot sell at  any price, if the  s t a t e  loan is t o  be kept. 
Thereafter, prices are entirely f ree  and subject t o  the forces of supply and 
demand. As regards cooperative dwellings the tenant  can sell anytime a t  any 
price. 
Rent  control is a very important feature  of the Swedish housing market and has 
been the focal point of study, debate  and reform (Kemeny, 1981; Turner, 1982). 
The principle is again t o  set rents  throughout the l ifetime of a dwelling in such a 
way as t o  cover the construction, maintenance and operating costs of the  
dwelling so  tha t  the owner, a non-profit company or private owner, makes no 
profit. 
W e  now turn to  an examination of the non-profit company, which is essential t o  
understanding the concept of rent  pooling. A non-profit company contracts  a 
building firm t o  construct rental  housing and thereaf ter  owns and manages the 
rental  units. The principle of no profit applies a t  the company level. Annually, 
each company totals  the costs of i ts  entire stock. These costs include tha t  year's 
loan payments plus an est imate  of maintenance, operation and any new con- 
struction costs. Also included a re  any funds needed to  replenish the company's 
reserves. Dividing this total  cost  es t imate  by the number of rental  dwellings in 
the company gives the  average ren t  per dwelling in the company. This average 
ren t  is then adjusted for various dwellings in the company according t o  size, age- 
standard and other factors. This process of rent  pooling and adjustment is 
resolved in annual negotiations between representatives of each non-profit 
company and representatives of the tenants of t ha t  company, who are  members 
of the  national tenants' association, and regional or municipal representatives of 
the  tenants' association. During these negotiations, the tenants' association 
examines the company's bookkeeping and requires t o  see income from interest  
and other investments of the non-profit companies. 
Tenants a r e  of ten opposed to  pooling and new construction by the  company, 
because in t imes of rising construction costs, pooling increases the rents of 
existing tenants. The companies' e f for t s  t o  adjust rents  by size and standard do 
not resemble a market  adjustment. In 1972, a national committee composed by 
representatives of the  non-profit companies association (SABO) and the tenants 
association recommended the use of a point system which assigns points t o  
buildings by their age and then makes adjustments for  location, social services, 
commercial services, etc. This point system is not used in any formal way nor 
does it seem to  have any scientific or  statistically valid rationale. In any event, 
such a point system would only work in bringing relat ive rents wi th in a company 
more in l ine wi th a free market rent structure, but  cannot correct the 
discrepancy in rents among companies. 7 
Clearly, di f ferent non-profit companies must charge very di f ferent average rents 
i f  they have significantly di f ferent construction profi les over time, namely 
different vintage mixes. For  example, new companies which were set up i n  the 
sixties to build in the new suburbs o f  Stockholm would charqe rents much higher 
for f lats identical t o  those held by older companies which bu i l t  in Stockholm 
during the fourties and fifties. A ref lect ion o f  this rent  pooling scheme is  that  
the rent for  the same type of f l a t  increases wi th distance f rom the c i t y  center, 
contrary t o  what would be normally observed i n  a free market. 
Another e f fec t  of rent  pooling is observed in Stockholm where the municipal 
companies of the c i t y  o f  Stockholm have, in the past, bu i l t  housing on land 
bought or leased f rom suburban municipalities. The costs of these relatively new 
outlying buildings are pooled w i th  the older and centrally located buildings owned 
by the same company. Thus, tenants in these buildings can end up paying rents 
which are much lower than the rents paid by tenants in the stock bui l t  by the 
suburban company. 
Another issue which features prominently i n  the negotiations is the cost of 
vacancies in the stock of a company, particularly any newly bui l t  stock. A 
position formulated by SABO is that  the municipalities should subsidize the cost 
of vacancies in excess of 1.5 per cent of the potential to ta l  rent  income. This is 
negotiated w i th  each municipality and most have agreed to  follow this practice. 
Negotiations are held once a year to set the rents of the following year. The 
tenants' association negotiates separately w i th  each company and also w i th  the 
local association o f  pr ivate landlords. I f  a specific set of negotiations wi th a non- 
pro f i t  company is deadlocked, the case is  appealed to  the "national committee on 
the rental market", which consists o f  off ic ials elected f rom SABO and members 
of the tenants' association. This committee then decides on a compromise rent 
level for the coming year. The associations of pr ive landlords cannot appeal to 
this committee, but  instead can seek recourse in the courts. 
I t  appears tha t  there  is substantial variance in t he  negotiating powers of 
different non-profit companies and their respective tenants. Even though non- 
profit, a few companies have accumulated reserves, while most of  them have 
survived on much tighter budgets. 
Throughout Sweden there  is  a policy, followed with various degrees of con- 
sistency, t o  ration new dwellings in municipal queues. In this paper we will focus 
on how this is done in Greater  Stockholm where the  22 municipal housing 
agencies have been consolidated into the Stockholm Federation of Municipal 
Housing Agencies (KSB), thus creating a single public queue a t  the  metropolitan 
level, into which all dwellings available for rationing a r e  pooled. 
There is a complicated set of rules that  govern how KSB rations dwellings. By 
law, all dwellings built since 1968 with government loans (this includes rental, 
cooperative and single family homes) are  available to  be claimed by KSB every 
t ime they are  ready for letting. However, KSB chooses t o  exercise this right 
differentially. KSB does not exercise the right to  sell single family homes the 
first time, but will le t  them if they a re  rental single family homes. In the case of 
cooperatives, there  a r e  special agreements between KSB and particular coope- 
rative associations. The agreement with HSB is tha t  this association should sell 
all of i ts  new cooperative flats. Riksbyggen, on the other  hand, gives all of i ts  
cooperative units t o  KSB for rationing. Agreements with other associations 
provide, fo r  example, t ha t  they assign 50 per cent  of  their new cooperative units 
to  specific banks which in turn ration these units t o  their customers who raise 
the  down payment by participating in the banks' savings programs for coopera- 
tive tenant ownership. 
In addition to  all t he  newly built rental  dwellings, KSB also handles around 
50 per cen t  of the  vacancies in the  existing stock. The remaining half is available 
for rental  directly from private landlords. 
It is estimated tha t  approximately 15 per cent  of the  total  mobility in Greater  
Stockholm is handled through KSB. On the supply side of the  queue there is a rule 
tha t  KSB has approximately three months to  fill a flat. If a f l a t  is not filled in 
this  period, i t  is  returned t o  t h e  landlord or non-profit company who generally 
prefer  t o  d o  thei r  own le t t ing unless the f l a t  in question is in a difficult-to-rent 
location. 
T o  obtain a f l a t  f rom KSB, a household fills out  an  application describing i t s  
cur ren t  dwelling and i t s  desired dwelling, and a maximum r e n t  i t  i s  willing t o  pay 
for it. This application must be  renewed annually if t h e  household remains in t h e  
queue t h a t  long. A household receives a maximum of th ree  ren ta l  offers  and is 
e jec ted  from t h e  queue if it re jec t s  those offers. In few cases  i t  happens t h a t  a 
landlord o r  non-profit company will object  t o  a tenant  assigned by KSB. In such 
cases, KSB can go t o  cour t  on behalf of the  tenant,  but  this rarely happens. 
Another rule is t h a t  if a cur ren t  tenant  is assigned t o  a dwelling by KSB, then  
t h a t  tenant's vacated dwelling must be turned over to  KSB for reletting. 
Out  of t h e  to ta l  number of f l a t s  tha t  KSB handles, roughly around 20 per c e n t  is 
al lotted t o  households with severe  medical or  social problems and households 
which must be evacuated because their  f l a t s  a r e  beeing reconstructed. 
F o r  t h e  remaining 80 per  c e n t  of the  f la ts  KSB uses a six priority classification 
of households according t o  assessed need. Priority one includes households 
dislocated because of various emergencies such a s  f ire etc.  and families in 
heavily overcrowded flats. Priori ty two consists of households with children, but  
living for instance with the i r  parents  or in substandard flats. Priori ty th ree  
covers  households without a f l a t  but  with children t h a t  c a n  s tay elsewhere (as  
occurs  a f t e r  a divorce when children can s tay with one parent). Priority four 
includes mainly households without children and with a substandard flat. Priority 
five covers  households which want t o  swap their  flats. Also in this priority a r e  
those who have a cooperative and want t o  move t o  a renta l  unit. Finally, priority 
six consists of households which do not currently live in G r e a t e r  Stockholm but  
need t o  move in. 
The above assessments of need t a k e  precedence over the  t ime an applicant has  
been waiting in the  queue. However, when need is equal, then the  t ime  one has 
been waiting in the  queue is a deciding factor. The t ime  a household spends 
waiting in a queue can vary enormously depending on the  location, type and price 
of the  desired flat. 
L7 S w i n g ,  Black Markets, Mobility end Household Formation 
Although the public queue is  extremely important because it is the only means by 
which new rental  dwellings are l e t  and a very v i ta l  means of entering the market 
for some households, it amounts to  only about 15 per cent o f  mobi l i ty in Greater 
Stockholm, 
The predominant and legal means o f  relocation is the swapping of one dwelling 
for another without any side payments, Such swaps can occur between two 
tenants or an owner and a tenant and are generally believed to  be responsible for 
perhaps 75 per cent of t o ta l  household mobility. Swappers f ind each other 
through newspaper columns, through the services of realtors or through friends 
and acquaintances, Two households getting married w i l l  of ten swap their two 
units wi th the one uni t  of a household that is undergoing a divorce. There are 
generally no restrictions on the nature of the swaps that can be undertaken. 
It appears that Swedish regulations are unclear about what constitutes legal 
pricing during a swap. For  example, i t  is legal to swap one's cooperative unit  
wi th a tenant's apartment. I f  the apartment is attract ive and wel l  located, the 
owner of the cooperative may substantially lower the selling price. Does this 
constitute a fair transaction or a black market transaction? 
Swapping differs f rom what might be called a direct black market transaction, 
which is clearly illegal. While it is not i l legal t o  pay to get a rental  contract it is 
i l legal t o  receive payment. Financial penalties and jai l  sentences may be 
enforced, Black market transactions are believed to  be significant but not very 
large, 
It is obvious that these institutions of swapping, black markets and the public 
queue have a pronounced impact on household formation and mobility. New 
households w i th  young members do not have a f l a t  to  swap nor the income to buy 
and are thus restricted to  entering the public queue. Since this queue is  not as 
eff ic ient or fast as a free market can be, it is reasonable to conclude that i t  
retards household formation, forcing these young households to remain longer 
w i th  their parents or to join into other forms of co-tenancy. 
Swapping and the black market also retard mobil i ty because they involve 
proceares of matching and search which are much more cumbersome and risky 
than those of a free market where vacancies can be rented directly from the  
landlords on a first-come, first-served basis a t  the going rent. 
The Swedish S ta te  and municipalities jointly administer a system of housinq 
allowances designed t o  improve the housing consumption of certain household 
groups. The percentaqe of rent  to be covered by the housinq allowance is 
determined on the  basis of household income and wealth, the rent  or price to  be 
paid by the household, and number of children. There is also a special municipal 
allowance system for pensioners. Households a re  eligible for allowances regard- 
less of dwelling type and tenure. 
In 1981, total  housinq consumption expenditures amounted to  20 per cen t  of total  
private consumption, a percentaqe which has remained stable over the years. In 
the same year, about 9 per cent  of total  housing consumption expenditures were 
paid as  rent allowances and another 12 per cent  of housing expenditures was paid 
in interest subsidies. Thus 22 per cen t  of total  housing expenditure was sub- 
sidized in allowances. 
In summary, even though the purpose of rent control in Sweden is intended to  
keep down the average cost of housing, the S ta te  and municipalities recognize 
the need of many groups and contribute significantly in an effor t  to improve 
their housing consumption relative t o  the rest  of the population. A large number 
of households receives such allowances, although the bulk of the payments are  
concentrated on pensioners and those underconsuming housing. 
1.9 Haainp and the Income  ax" 
Sweden is a country with extremely high income taxation. Thus, income tax 
subsidies t o  homeowners, landlords and non-profit companies which own housing 
are  of special significance. The S t a t e  income tax is progressive for individuals. 
The municipal tax is not progressive and although i t  varies somewhat by 
municipality and is set annually, it is generally around 30 per cent  of income and 
is divided roughly equally between the county and the municipality. The tota l  
income tax rate fo r  the average industrial workers is  about 40 per cent and the 
marginal income tax ra te  is a b w t  65 per cent. For  companies the income tax is 
around 52 per cent o f  net  taxable income. 
The treatment o f  housing within the Swedish income tax system relies on 
"assessed (or taxation) valuen. In Sweden, buildings are assessed every f ive years 
and the aasessed value is defined as 75 per cent o f  the estimated fair market 
value. 
Housing is an asset t o  which income is imputed. Non-profit companies and 
cooperative associations impute a f lat  3 per cent of assessed value. Owners o f  
single family homes must impute as income a percentage which increases w i th  
assessed value. A t  present, this percentage starts a t  2 per cent and increases to 
0 per cent. F r o m  the imputed income, the owner subtracts interest payments. If, 
i n  this calculation, the dwelling generates a loss, as is usually the case fo r  
owners o f  single family housing, the loss can be netted against other income. 
Starting in 1983, there i s  a new rule which w i l l  go in to  f u l l  e f fec t  in 1985. This 
rule w i l l  l i m i t  the taxes saved f rom the ownership o f  single family housing, by 
the deduction o f  loss due to interest payments, to no more than 50 per cent o f  
taxes. This rule applies in fact  t o  a l l  losses due to  interest payments. 
Independently of the imputed income calculations, a l l  housing owners pay a 
"property tax" t o  the municipality. This tax is computed by adding 1.5 per cent 
o f  the assessed value t o  the income taxable by the municipality. 
A second aspect concerns the treatment o f  capital  gains and losses i n  the income 
tax system. In Sweden, income f rom the sale of an asset is  ordinary taxable 
income, but  housing is afforded special treatment as in the United States. In  this 
case the taxable capital  gain is the "real capital gain", i.e. an adjustment is made 
for inflation. Starting in 1981, the State introduced a change i n  this method in 
order t o  'discourage short-term speculation in home ownership. This change 
prohibits the use of the inf lat ion factor for  sales that  occur wi th in f ive years o f  
the purchase o f  housing. Thus, unlike the U.S. tax system which taxes only 
nominal capital  gains, the Swedish system taxes nominally only short-term 
capital gains. As in the U.S., capital gains for homeowners are postponable under 
certain rules. Thew am that  the gain exceed a minimum amount, that  the owner 
must have been the occupant fo r  a t  least three out of the f ive years immediately 
preceding the sale, and tha t  a more expensive house be bought wi th in one year of 
the sale. A capital gain realized f rom a cooperative dwelling is  ful ly taxable only 
i f  the dwelling was held less than two years. The percentage of the capital  gain 
which is  taxable falls t o  25 per cent when the ownership period exceeds f ive 
years. Assessed values fo r  cooperative buildings are prorated t o  specific units on 
the basis of their aham in floor space. Interest is  paid direct ly by the association 
and deducted in i t s  income tax calculations, whereas capital  gains and losses are 
taken by the individual tenant-owner. 
A n  income tax feature which concerns owner-occupiers and rents alike is that  
housing allowances are tax-free. 
The deductibility of interest payments has a substantial e f fec t  on the net housing 
expenditures of the owners of single family homes. In the year 1981, the to ta l  
"foregone tax revenues" for owners o f  single family houses corresponded to  
20 per cent o f  to ta l  housing consumption expenditures by a l l  households i n  that 
year. 
Since 1983 a special tax is  levied on rental  and cooperative houses bui l t  before 
1975 wi th the exception o f  those bu i l t  or reconstructed w i th  the support of State 
loans af ter  1957. The tax for 1983 was 1 per cent of the assessed value and is 
raised to  1.5 per cent and 2 per cent for  1984 and 1985 respectively. The tax is  
somewhat inaccurately called the 'hntalhouse-fee" and is  motivated on pari ty 
grounds since the guaranteed interest rate for  the subsidized housing is con- 
tinuously raised by 0.25 per cent per year, compared to  0.5 per cent per year for 
single family housing. 
According to  a recent government proposition the rental-house-fee is to be 
replaced in 1985 by a new state property tax motivated by fiscal needs. Fo r  
privately owned renta l  houses the tax ra te  is  2 per cent of the assessed value and 
the tax i s  deductible. Fo r  non-profit companies and cooperatives the rate is 
1.4 per cent o f  the assessed value and the tax is non-deductible. Fo r  single 
family houses the taxe ra te  for 1985 is 0.5 per cent of 1/3 of the assessed value. 
Fo r  1986 and 1987 the tax ra te  for these houses increases to  1 per cent and 
1.4 per cent respectively. Fo r  single family houses the tax is  not deductible. 
The parliament is  expected t o  consider the proposition late in the  fall of 1984. 
The minister for housing will l a te r  this year propose an adjustment (decrease) of 
the guaranteed interest  levels for subsidized housing in order t o  avoid the ex t ra  
burden ctn these dwellings which will occur otherwise. 
Starting in 1984 a new s t a t e  tax is introduced in Sweden called t he  "profit- 
sharing-taxn. The revenues of this tax are  funnelled into five wage- 
earners' funds. As t o  the housing market  the new tax is  levied upon private 
house-owning companies (non-profit companies and cooperatives a r e  excluded 
and so a r e  also private persons). The tax amounts t o  20 per cen t  of a calculated 
"profit" since the  assets and liabilities have been adjusted for inflation according 
to  a complicated formula. I t  is still unclear how high the profit-sharing tax will 
be a s  a percentage of profit in these companies calculated in a normal way. 
1.10 Building Contractors  and the Building Materials 1ndustry12 
Although the pricing of all new housing is subject to the  stringent controls 
discussed above, the  Swedish industry of building contractors is competit ive and 
free of government controls. There a r e  between 10 and 15 large building 
contractors which dominate the  multifamily market, and a vast number of 
smaller contractors  operating in the  single family sector. In the multifamily 
market during the  seventies the f i rms either carried losses or made small profit 
margins. Larger profit margins could be made in the building of commercial  and 
industrial developments which were not subject to  rent  contrul measures. 
In contrast  t o  the  contractors, the  industries for most building materials a re  
highly monopolized. Rates  of re turn on working capital  in various building 
materials industries seem to  be higher than the average for  all of Swedish 
industry. For  example, the  ready-mix concrete industry (in which firms have 
great  spatial monopoly power because of distance constraints in the shipping of 
this material) and the wall paper industry, which is highly monopolized, have 
shown recent  returns on working capi ta l  of 20 per cent  and higher. 
A working hypothesis for the recent  price inflation in building materials (which 
exceeds the general inflation) is t he  decline in new construction and the increase 
in modernization and reconstruction. This shift  has  greatly shrunk total  building 
volume, forcing these industries t o  raise prices t o  cover fixed costs incurred in 
the past. 
One disturbing aspect of the high degree of monopolistic market structure in the  
Swedish building materials industry is t ha t  price-setting in this industry can 
defeat  the purpose of cost-covering ren t  control t o  keep rents  low. Profits, 
which in a free market  would accrue t o  landowners, could to  a great  extent  pass 
on to  the suppliers of building materials whose price sett ing behavior is 
unregulated. 
SWEDISH POUCY ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES FOR REFORM 
In this ssction we first  discuss some policy issues within the institutional s ta tus  
quo. These issues center  on various means of fine tuning the performance of the 
housing sector. Next we discuss, f rom the f ree  market viewpoint, major 
alternatives for reforming the current institutional structure. 
2.1 Swedish Policy Issues 
One area  of major policy concern in Sweden is the interaction between macro- 
economic policy and the housing sector. The S t a t e  and municipalities induce 
major changes in supply and demand a s  a result of their assistance and control 
policies. The induced changes in turn influence municipal and S ta te  revenues and 
thus have a direct  bearing on fiscal balance a t  the local and national levels. 
Furthermore, Swedish subsidy structures a r e  not a t  steady s t a t e  and changes a r e  
continually introduced. There is, a s  well, the  more routine problem of annually 
adjusting housing allowances, and tax rates. A major problem, therefore, is the 
macro-economic impact of the government's own housing policy a s  well as  the 
impact of such policy on the housing market  and the housing stock and the 
bui1,ding contractors  and building materials industries. Can these interactions be 
controlled and predicted in such a way tha t  changes in the current public 
assistance s t ructure  can  be introduced consistently and with stability? 
An area of particular importance is the volume of building activity that  should 
take place, and the distribution of i t  by region and municipality. Durinq the one 
million dwelling program, which came to an end in the midseventies, Sweden 
achieved i ts  goal of 100,000 new dwellings per year, but overbuilding occurred in 
some regions. During this program, the S t a t e  planned the distribution of the new 
stock among the municipalities for each budget year. Since then, targets  a r e  
down to about 35,000 dwellings per year and the S ta te  is allowing municipalities 
t o  a c t  with grea te r  autonomy on the issue of how much to  build. There a r e  
questions about the relative distribution of the planned stock between, say, 
Greater  Stockholm and the rest of the nation, a t  a t ime when planners a re  
predicting new growth in metropolitan areas  a f t e r  a period of stagnation. 
Another issue is the rationing of new dwellings in a metropolitan area such a s  
Stockholm. Even though only 10 per cen,t of the mobility is determined through 
this rationing process, the  stock being rationed and the households accommo- 
dated (mostly new or  dislocated households) a r e  important par ts  of the market. 
What is the effect in terms of equity and efficiency, of the currently used 
priority system and how would this compare with alternative systems such as  
first-come, first-served? 
The structure of government intervention is so complex in Sweden tha t  i t  is 
difficult, if not impossible, t o  know what the combined e f fec t s  of all the policies 
are. Is the  government, on the whole, subsidizing ownership relative to  tenancy, 
or vice versa? On the  whole, a re  government policies stimulating the growth of 
cooperatives relative t o  other dwelling types? Are government subsidies increas- 
ing or reducing the  gap in the disposable incomes of rich and poor household 
groups? The answers t o  these questions ought to  be known, but Swedish 
government policies a r e  so complex and their overlapping e f f ec t s  so difficult t o  
disentaqle tha t  the  answers are  not known. 
A summary of policy-oriented research issues for the 1980's can be found in 
Swedish Council for Buil,ding Research, 1983; pages 71-74. 
Alternatives for Reform 
From the free marke t  point of view, the Swedish institutions a re  extremely 
cumbersome and inefficient and thus in pressing need of reform. 
There i8 a bcenario of total  reform which should be discussed first. This scenario 
is  rooted firmly in the basic principles of competitive general equilibrium theory, 
A t  the same time, i t  deals fully with the Swedish ideal of the communal and 
collective ownership of par t  of the housing stock a s  a resource or an inter- 
generational merit  good. 
Under this scenario, the  non-profit companies and cooperative associations would 
be  decentralized into small and independent firms competitive with each other. 
These firms would decide freely the quantity and type of housing they should 
supply and they would charge frem market prices, selling or renting to  the  highest 
bidder. Institutions of public queueing and swapping would be eliminated with 
households rentinq and buying directly from the suppliers by paying the going 
price. The government's role will be in carefully monitoring the prof i t  of each 
company and then levying taxes, whereby these profits would be collected and 
redistributed as  a social dividend to  the tenants and those who bought housing. 
Thus, the social objective of no-profit in housing development is achieved 
without restricting mobility and simultaneously with an efficient allocation of 
households to  dwellings. Under this free-market scenario, households would live 
in their most preferred location and dwelling and the market would be induced to  
supply the  quantity and type of dwellings according to  demand. Of course, there 
is room within this scenario for a system of housing allowances and homeowner 
tax subsidies t o  assist special groups. There is also room for a policy t o  subsidize 
construction and modernization in order t o  protect the supply of housing from 
the  fluctuation of interest  ra tes  and to  enable a steady s t a t e  expansion of the 
stock, regardless of cycles in the general economy. 
If such reform were t o  be introduced overnight, there might be chaotic 
adjustments and qrea t  upheaval. I t  is possible, of course, t o  introduce i t  
gradually and according t o  a predetermined and preannounced plan so that  
adjustments by market  participants will be also gradual, anticipatory, and well 
planned. A major legitimate concern under this scenario a r e  the qrea t  changes 
which may occur in the  locations of various groups in an a r ea  such a s  Greater 
Stockholm. It  is a certainty that  the  price of dwellings in central  Stockholm 
would greatly increase, with those in the suburbs losing value. In the long run, 
there could be intense redevelopment in central  Stockholm. Low income groups 
could drift  out t o  the suburbs in the  short run, reconcentrating back in the center 
in the longer run a f t e r  the  stock has had time to  adjust to  higher densities. 
Within the doctrines o f  free market economics, a l l  these changes w i l l  be for the 
good o f  a l l  except for one perplexing question. What would be the mismatch 
between t b  location of various groups and the accessibility o f  specialized public 
services t o  them? What would be the public sector costs of reestablishing such 
accessibility? These questions requim careful investigation since the supply and 
distribution of  public services is  t b  pride and most succesaful aspect of  Swedish 
urban planning. 
There are other scenarios o f  piecemeal (or partial) reform which may also be 
seen as steps in a gradual ful f i l lment of the to ta l  reform scenario. The simplest 
o f  these may be t o  do away wi th  the public queueing mechanism, allowing a l l  
suppliers o f  housing to direct ly l e t  vacancies. Another step is to legalize a l l  
second hand (and currently black) transactions in the rental  apartment market, 
thus reducing greatly the need to  swap dwellings, and improving mobi l i ty for a l l  
by making it legal t o  directly rent  any vacancy in this stock. 
It is wise for Swedish politicians t o  show some interest in the benefits and costs 
o f  such piecemeal reform measures. It is not a t  a l l  clear that  the values of 
Swedish society are opposed to  a l l  such measures or that they would be badly 
compromised by them. 
The costs o f  adjustment and transition (both social and private costs) need to be 
carefully evaluated and weighed against the benefits of greater pr ivate well- 
being and lower bureaucratic complexity. It is possible that Swedish institutions 
have deviated so drastically f rom a free market state that any major reform is 
too costly to  undertake now. We feel, however, that this is unlikely and that 
Swedish society could greatly benefit f rom a t  least some major reform efforts. 
It is not very l ikely that Sweden's politicans w i l l  follow the suggestion o f  
deregulating the housing sector even though it may sometimes be tempting to  do 
away w i th  the existing patchwork and start  afresh. One might say that  for a 
housing system so highly influenced by rules, regulations, and institutions, 
uncommon to a free market, that situation is not really relevant as a point of 
reference. 
In Sweden, the justif ication for  the public regulation of the housing stock has 
been primari ly one o f  equity and distributive justice among dif ferent social 
I 
groups and generations. This justification, however, is greatly t ied up wi th other 
frequently discussed justifications stemming from the potential failures of a free 
market t o  supply and allocate housing. It is important that  we consider these 
briefly. One justif ication is  that  there are market failures in the supply of 
housing: building capital  is  long l ived and free market expectations o f  the future 
are inevitably inaccurate resulting in inefficient supply patterns. Even though 
government expectations o f  the future may be no better, public controls can 
enforce a more eff ic ient pat tern o f  supply reducing the need for ineff ic ient free 
market speculation. Such government policies may be seen as acceptable second- 
best strategies. Municipal land controls may be a sensible strategy f rom this 
point o f  view, as might the system of construction subsidies which d i f fer  by 
dwelling type. A second justif ication is that the web of housing contains 
elements of the public infrastructure networks or is closely associated w i th  such 
networks. This provides the 'rationale for master plans which t reat  housing supply 
in conjunction wi th public goods provision. 
A third justif ication is that  the externalities (social and economic) which arise 
f rom the supply o f  housing are very significant. Again, this view justifies the 
presence of careful master planning and some supply side subsidies. A fourth 
justif ication is the argument that  the longevity of housing makes it an inter- 
generational private good. Since the preferences of future generations cannot be 
adequately represented in  current markets, the government should step i n  to 
enforce a second best intergenerational Pareto efficiency. A f i f t h  argument is 
that household mobil i ty in a free market because of lack of information is an 
ineff ic ient process which retards overall housing market efficiency. Government 
mobi l i ty controls and rationing mechanisms are therefore introduced part ly i n  
the belief that they are more ef f ic ient  than market transaction processes. 
The above arguments may have a l imi ted role i n  justifying the current regula- 
tions of the Swedish housing market but we believe that  the equity considera- 
tions are much more dominant. The central policy questions, therefore, are two: 
(1) what are the Swedish decision makers objectives regarding equity and 
redistributive justice? (2) are the current housing market regulations, the most 
eff icient way of achieving these objectives or are they too complicated and 
costly? 
To carry ou t  the policy analyses called for in the previous section, a mathe- 
matical model of the Swedish housinq market a t  the metropolitan level is 
necessary. The system is so complex tha t  any qualitative analysis will need t o  be 
strengthened by quantitative methods. What is needed is a quantitative policy 
model t ha t  provides unambiguous answers t o  complex questions. 
In building a behaviorally based and empirically tractable model of the metro- 
politan housinq market, it is instructive t o  consider the experience of urban 
modeling in the United States  a s  well a s  prior work in Sweden (Gustafsson, et al., 
1977; Harsman, 1981; Snickars, 1982; Brownstone, e t  al., 1983). 
W e  restrict  our interest  to  economic models such a s  the National Bureau of 
Economic Research Model (Kain and Apgar, 1977), the Urban Insti tute Model 
(de Leeuw and Struyk, 1975) and the Chicago Area Transportation-Land Use 
Analysis System (Anas, 1983) since these three a r e  the only empirically im- 
plemented and policy tested large scale models of the American housing market. 
The first two of these models have been applied t o  tes ts  of the e f fec t s  of housing 
. allowances on the housing consumption patterns of recipient households. 
CATLAS, the Chicago model, has been applied to  rigorous ecunometric testing of 
the effect  of rapid transit investment in Chicago on household mobility, mode 
choice patterns and changes in housing values and new residential construction. 
It is possible t o  use the methodology and basic mathematical-econometric 
structure of CATLAS a s  a starting point for building a model for Sweden. 
I t  is clear from the previous section of this paper tha t  the nature of the Swedish 
housing market differs substantially from i ts  American counterpart. For this 
reason, CATLAS can  only serve a s  a useful starting point with many important 
adaptations necessary during the model development process. The purpose of this 
section is t o  anticipate and explain these adaptations, and to  outline to  the  
extent  possible the form of the model t ha t  is likely t o  emerge. 
The major problem wi th modeling the demand side of the Swedish housing market 
is  the complexity o f  the households choice process. This observation applies to  
existing households already in the market as wel l  as, and perhaps more so, t o  new 
households being formed in the market. Because of the severe restraints on 
mobility, household formation and housing choice become a joint decision, 
greatly compounding the analytical e f fo r t  needed to model the process. 
The above d i f f icu l ty  aside, Swedish households face a complicated decision tree 
once in the housing market. A t  the outset, the major choice is  whether to  enter 
the "free" single family market or whether to  seek rental  or col lect ive ownership 
in the mul t i fami ly  stock. The choice to  enter the single family or cooperative 
market depends largely on the income or wealth of the household and t o  a lesser 
degree on education, family size a ~ d  other social variables. The expectations of 
households regarding future capital  gains play an important role as we 11. 
The choice to  enter the renta l  market (or t o  relocate within or in and out of this 
market) leads to  a more complex set o f  decisions. A household must decide 
among the several avenues available for  obtaining housing in this controlled 
market. As described in the last section, the major choices are entering the 
government queue, swapping, entering the black market as a renter, or renting 
f rom a pr ivate landlord. There are other possibilities such as renting housing 
units bought by one's employer, who may find i t  profitable to  provide such a 
service in order to a t t rac t  skilled employees. Households already in the con- 
trol led market and wishing t o  relocate must consider whether they wish to enter 
the black market on both sides as an alternative to a l l  of the above options. 
Choosing to  enter the government queue is  a reversible decision a t  the expense 
o f  waiting some t ime without results. Because o f  this, households most certainly 
make e f fo r ts  to anticipate the government's decision to  assign them to  their  
desired housing unit. A n  important factor is the expected length of stay in the 
search mode (government queue, pr ivate search for a swap or other) which is 
traded o f f  against attr ibutes o f  the housing stock much more extensively than 
would be the case in a free housing market. A d i f f icu l t  part  of the modeling 
process, therefore, is the household decision t o  relocate since such a decision 
involves significant transaction costs. One should note, however, that  di f ferent 
search options are available for di f ferent submarkets. Another major d i f f icu l ty  is 
modellnq the households* anticipation o f  the government's probabilities to accept 
or reject them f rom the government queue. 
The above decision process can be modeled as a nested logi t  model wi th several 
levels o f  nesting. F rom the data which we are using, location by municipality, 
housing tenum by single versus multifamily, housing type by number o f  rooms, by 
age and by standard a m  the levels of nesting which would be fa i r ly  natural t o  
adopt. The nested logi t  model which could then be estimated would have to take 
into account the income tax structure, the housing allowance structure and the 
e f fec t  o f  these .on household disposable income. Measures o f  municipal public 
service quality should be used to  model the choice o f  location by municipality. 
Data on black market  transactions is scarce, and indeed experts widely disagree 
on the size o f  the Swedish black market. In facing this d i f f icu l ty  it is important 
t o  develop a theoretically complete model which may encompass black market 
transactions but  can be estimated without observing the black market. 
3.2 The Supply Side 
The supply decisions in the single family market would be modeled as in CATLAS 
via a nested or hierarchical decision process. In the short run (one year in 
CATLAS) the decision i s  whether an existing dwelling should be offered for rent  
or kept vacant by the owner. This decision is determined primari ly by comparing 
the maintenance and occupancy costs of dwellings t o  the same costs for vacant 
dwellings and obtaining a maintenance cost di f ferent ial  which is then compared 
to  the rent  of an occupied dwelling. Extrapolating this calculation into the 
future, owners o f  housing estimate the present value o f  future rentals that w i l l  
result f rom an existing dwelling, taking into account that the dwelling w i l l  
remain vacant some proportion of the time. F rom such present value calcu- 
lations, owners o f  land decide whether to  build new dwellings or whether to  keep 
land vacant and whether t o  demolish existing dwellings and create land. The 
above nested supply model decision structure has been estimated wi th census 
data for  the Chicago metropolitan area and is, in principle, applicable to the 
Swedish case as well. 
There are, however, modifications that w i l l  be needed. It is important to  
recognize tha t  in Sweden the  municipalities are the t rue  suppliers of housing. 
The quantity and type of housing they supply depends only in par t  on the  costs 
borne by the  non-profit companies. I t  also depends on the political preferences of 
the electoral community and on the indirect costs  of public infrastructure 
provision to  be borne by the  municipality itself. Housing provision has an impact 
on the tax mvenues of municipalities, and vacancies t ha t  must be subsidized 
have a negative influence on the  municipal budget. Since municipalities a re  few 
in number, modeling their  behavior may require an oligopolistic competition 
approach adapted t o  t he  public sector. I t  should be remembered, however, tha t  
the central  role of municipalities implies tha t  good da ta  exist  in accessible form 
to  describe the behavior of them a s  housing market agents. 
3.3 l.be of the Model in Policy Analysis 
The model discussed here can  be used t o  test the policy issues of section 11. In 
doing so, a layer by layer approach to  uncovering the e f fec t s  of each of the 
policies is needed. 
A baseline policy simulation would examine how the market  would operate given 
the same household preferences and the same housing stock with all current 
institutions (rationing, allowances, rent control, subsidies and the like) removed. 
Such a free market simulation would indicate certain efficiency and equity 
consequenes when compared to  the actual Swedish situation. 
Following this baseline simulation, one can introduce each policy, or combi- 
nations of policies, in order t o  observe the marginal impact of each policy as 
well as  the counterproductive or reinforcing interactions among the policies on 
the efficiency and equity objectives. 
After such broad and sweeping policy tes ts  are  concluded, there should be enough 
insight developed t o  know which of the existing policies a r e  worth fine-tuning 
and in which direction. I t  is then hoped tha t  the model could be used t o  
recommend realistic and politically acceptable marginal improvements on 
housing allowance and tax incentive formulae a s  well a s  possible marginal 
improvements of other  institutions. 
The ucre o f  the model in policy analysis should be considered during the 
formulation o f  the model framework. The reason is that  a successful use o f  a 
quantitative model for policy design, and evaluation, presupposes a clear 
def ini t ion o f  policy variables already a t  the outset o f  the modelling activity. An 
at tempt ahoul,d be made a t  modelling policy schemes in the way they are enacted 
by the planning actors. An example may be the housing allowance system where 
el igibi l i ty rules and subsidy payment schemes are explicit ly spelled out t o  be 
introduced direct ly in a model. Another example may be a special submodel fo r  
the formation o f  actual disposable income. Such a submodel w i l l  be quite 
complex since disposable income w i l l  depend on housing consumption. Also, the 
tax and subsidy systems have lagged ef fects which make a dynamic, or  recursive 
approach the only satisfactory option. 
The primary a im o f  the policy analysis i n  this modelling exercise is t o  study the 
combined ef fect  o f  di f ferent policy actions. This is especially important i n  
Sweden where the housing system is influenced by so many competing subsidy 
and intervention systems. The question is: in the f inal  analysis, t o  what extent do 
the ef fects o f  the various controls reinforce or counteract each other? This 
question is impossible t o  answer without a quantitative model. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 The br ie f  l is t  o f  references a t  the end o f  this paper bears no 
indication o f  the exteneive unpublished material, the carefully docu- 
mented public statistics and the wealth o f  specific information that 
can be obtained by interviewing public off ic ials and experts. 
In large meaeure this model is envisaged as an adaptation of CATLAS 
(The Chicago Area Transportation Land Use Analysis System; Anas, 
1983) t o  the Swedish situation. Also see (Anas, 1982). 
The sparse figures presented in this paper have been extracted f rom 
the o f f i c ia l  statistics o f  Sweden (Statistics Sweden, 1983). 
Much o f  the information reported in this section is part ly based on 
the material  in (Sweden, 1902 and 1903). 
This section relies in par t  on interviews wi th Bengt Turner and Rune 
Wigren of the Swedish Council for Suildinq Research, G v l e ,  and 
Torsten Landqren o f  the Swedish Association o f  Municipal Housing 
Companies (SABO), Stockholm. 
This section relies in par t  on interviews wi th Bengt Turner and Rune 
Wigren of the Swedish Council for Building Research, G v l e ,  Torsten 
Landgren o f  S A 8 0  and Sven Bergenstrale. 
Sven Bergenststrale's recent independent research project on the 
ef fects o f  rent  pooling sponsored by the Tenants' Association has 
documented the presence o f  significant rent  differences for similar 
f lats in different companies. 
This section draws in part  on an interview wi th  Olle Svensson o f  the 
Stockholm Federation o f  Municipal Housing Agencies. 
The figures in this section have been extracted or constructed f rom 
(Statistics Sweden, 1983). 
The figures have been extracted or constructed from (Statistics 
Sweden, 1983). 
The figurets have been constructed from (Statistics Sweden, 1983). 
This section relies in part on an interview with 80 Lindorn (and 
presentations by his staff) of the Swedish Price Control Board. 
